h that of the sense qualities, Lange teaches that the human individual
is so organized that he must apprehend that which is sensuously given under
these forms. Others, on the contrary, urge that the individual soul with
its organization is itself a phenomenon, and consequently cannot be the
bearer of that which precedes phenomena--space, time, and the categories
as "conditions" of experience are functions of a pure consciousness to be
presupposed. The antithesis of subject and object, the soul and the world,
first arises in the sphere of phenomena. The empirical subject, like the
world of objects, is itself a product of the _a priori_ forms, hence not
that which produces them. To the transcendental group belong Hermann
Cohen[1] in Marburg, A. Stadler[2], Natorp, Lasswitz (p.17), E. Koenig (p.
17), Koppelmann (p. 330), Staudinger (p. 331). Fritz Schultze of Dresden is
also to be counted among the neo-Kantians (_Philosophy of Natural Science_,
1882; _Kant and Darwin_, 1875; _The Fundamental Thoughts of Materialism_,
1881; _The Fundamental Thoughts of Spiritualism_, 1883; _Comparative
Psychology_, i. 1, 1892).
[Footnote 1: Cohen: _Kant's Theory of Experience_, 1871, 2d ed., 1886;
_Kant's Foundation of Ethics_, 1877; _Kant's Foundation of Aesthetics_,
1889.]
[Footnote 2: Stadler: _Kant's Teleology_, 1874; _The Principles of the Pure
Theory of Knowledge in the Kantian Philosophy_, 1876; _Kant's Theory of
Matter_, 1883.]
The German positivists[1]:--E. Laas of Strasburg (1837-85), A. Riehl
of Freiburg in Baden (born 1844), and R. Avenarius of Zurich (born
1843)--develop their sensationalistic theory of knowledge in critical
connection with Kant. Ernst Laas defines positivism (founded by Protagoras,
advocated in modern times by Hume and J.S. Mill, and hostile to Platonic
idealism) as that philosophy which recognizes no other foundations than
positive facts (_i.e._, perceptions), and requires every opinion to exhibit
the experiences on which it rests. Its basis is constituted by three
articles of belief: (1) The correlative facts, subject and object, exist
and arise only in connection (objects are directly known only as the
contents of a consciousness, _cui objecta sunt_, subjects only as centers
of relation, as the scene or foundation of a representative content, _cui
subjecta sunt_: outside my thoughts body does not exist as body, nor I
myself as soul). (2) The variability of the objects of perception. (3)
Sensationalism-
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