ve German people: just as Napoleonic militarism was not crushed
at Waterloo and revived in 1849, because Napoleon still retained the
allegiance of the French people. It is inconceivable that the German
reactionaries will abdicate of their own free will. It is equally
inconceivable that the reaction will develop slowly and gradually into
a free democratic government, as von Bethmann-Hollweg would make us
believe in the historic speech of February 27. No doubt this war has
hastened on the day of retribution. And the pathos of the war lies in
this, that it has been a vicarious sacrifice, and that millions of
Frenchmen and Britons have died to prepare the liberation of a nation
of slaves. _But ultimately it is the German people themselves who must
work out their own salvation._ They will have to turn against their
oppressors some of that combativeness, of that fanaticism, of that
idealism, which hitherto they have only directed against their
European brethren.
II.
I stated at the outset that publicists have maintained a conspiracy of
silence on the coming German revolution, because they were afraid to
conjure up a sinister spectre, and because they are repelled by a
difficult and delicate subject. But there may be another and a more
plausible reason for their silence--namely, that most people simply
cannot believe in the very possibility of a German revolution. And if
you press them to state their definite reasons for such a belief, you
will probably find that all the arguments given can ultimately be
brought under the four following headings:
1. Militarism and reaction are too deeply rooted in Germany. The
reactionary forces are far too strong to leave any chance to a
successful revolution.
2. A revolution is impossible under modern conditions of warfare. A
few machine-guns, a few crack regiments of the Kaiser's bodyguard,
would at once drench the rebellion in rivers of blood.
3. The Social Democrats, the so-called "revolutionary party," have
themselves repudiated revolutionary methods.
4. The German temperament has not the initiative, the resilience,
which are the prime conditions of a successful revolution. The whole
German historical tradition is against any revolutionary solution, and
any radical reform must be imposed from outside.
Let us carefully and dispassionately examine each of those arguments.
III.
In the first place we are told that Prussian reaction is too strong,
and that for the Ger
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