ly currents set so strong that the crippled ships
could not regain Santa Lucia. On the 11th of May, between St. Kitts
and Antigua, he joined Rodney, who, after hurried repairs to the
_Russell_, had left St. Eustatius on the 5th, with that ship, the
_Sandwich_, and the _Triumph_.

It is somewhat difficult to criticise positively the conduct of Hood
and of de Grasse in this affair. It is clear that Hood on the first
day seriously sought action, though his force was but three-fourths
that of his foe. He tried first to take the offensive, and, failing
that, to induce his enemy to attack frankly and decisively. Troude
is doubtless correct in saying that it was optional with de Grasse
to bring on a general engagement; and the writer finds himself in
agreement also with another French authority, Captain Chevalier,
that "Count de Grasse seems to have been too much preoccupied with
the safety of his convoy on the 29th, Admiral Hood having shown
himself much less circumspect on that day than he was on the next.
Notwithstanding our numerical superiority, Count de Grasse kept
near the land until all the convoy were safe." He represents Hood as
fencing cautiously on the following day, keeping on the field, but
avoiding a decisive encounter. This differs somewhat from the version
of Hood himself, who mentions signalling a general chase to windward
at 12.30 P.M. of the 30th. The two statements are not irreconcilable.
Hood having coppered ships, had the speed of the French, whose
vessels, being partly coppered and partly not, sailed unevenly. The
British commander consequently could afford to take risks, and he
therefore played with the enemy, watching for a chance. Hood was
an officer of exceptional capacity, much in advance of his time. He
thoroughly understood a watching game, and that an opportunity might
offer to seize an advantage over part of the enemy, if the eagerness
of pursuit, or any mishap, caused the French to separate. From
any dilemma that ensued, the reserve of speed gave him a power of
withdrawal, in relying upon which he was right. The present writer
adopts here also Chevalier's conclusion: "Admiral Hood evidently had
the very great advantage over his enemy of commanding a squadron of
coppered ships. Nevertheless, homage is due to his skill and to the
confidence shown by him in his captains. If some of his ships had
dropped behind through injuries received, he would have had to
sacrifice them, or to fight a superior