nts to expand the intellectual form
of our thought; from there shall we derive the impetus necessary to lift
us above ourselves. To form an idea of the whole of life cannot consist
in combining simple ideas that have been left behind in us by life
itself in the course of its evolution. How could the part be equivalent
to the whole, the content to the container, a by-product of the vital
operation to the operation itself? Such, however, is our illusion when
we define the evolution of life as a "passage from the homogeneous to
the heterogeneous," or by any other concept obtained by putting
fragments of intellect side by side. We place ourselves in one of the
points where evolution comes to a head--the principal one, no doubt, but
not the only one; and there we do not even take all we find, for of the
intellect we keep only one or two of the concepts by which it expresses
itself; and it is this part of a part that we declare representative of
the whole, of something indeed which goes beyond the concrete whole, I
mean of the evolution movement of which this "whole" is only the present
stage! The truth is, that to represent this the entire intellect would
not be too much--nay, it would not be enough. It would be necessary to
add to it what we find in every other terminal point of evolution. And
these diverse and divergent elements must be considered as so many
extracts which are, or at least which were, in their humblest form,
mutually complementary. Only then might we have an inkling of the real
nature of the evolution movement; and even then we should fail to grasp
it completely, for we should still be dealing only with the evolved,
which is a result, and not with evolution itself, which is the act by
which the result is obtained.

Such is the philosophy of life to which we are leading up. It claims to
transcend both mechanism and finalism; but, as we announced at the
beginning, it is nearer the second doctrine than the first. It will not
be amiss to dwell on this point, and show more precisely how far this
philosophy of life resembles finalism and wherein it is different.

Like radical finalism, although in a vaguer form, our philosophy
represents the organized world as a harmonious whole. But this harmony
is far from being as perfect as it has been claimed to be. It admits of
much discord, because each species, each individual even, retains only a
certain impetus from the universal vital impulsion and tends to use this