is."

To this Baron Bignon immediately sent the following answer:

"_To Messieurs the Commissioners charged with the Armistice._

July the 1st.

"You announced to us, gentlemen, that you were authorized to believe,
that, if Napoleon Bonaparte were away, a suspension of hostilities
might be signed, during which a treaty for peace might be entered
into. _The desired condition being fulfilled_, there is at the present
moment no motive, that can oppose a suspension of hostilities, and an
armistice. It is strongly to be desired, that the suspension of
hostilities, instead of being for three days only, should be at least
for five.

"We do not think, that the English and Prussians alone will attempt to
force our lines. It would be gratuitously incurring useless losses.
According to their own account, they can be joined by the Bavarians
only in the first fortnight of this month: so that it may be
convenient to them to wait for this reinforcement, which is an
additional reason for their not refusing an armistice, that will be
attended with as much or more advantage to themselves than to us. In
fine, if the allies do not choose, to forget altogether their solemn
declarations, what do they now require? The only obstacle, that,
according to them, opposed the conclusion of peace, is irrevocably
removed: thus nothing any longer opposes its re-establishment; and, to
arrive at peace, nothing is more urgent than an armistice.

"The committee of government has had laid before it all the
particulars, that you have transmitted, of the language held to you by
the Duke of Wellington. It desires, gentlemen, that you will persist
in distinguishing the political question of the form of government of
France from the actual question, the conclusion of an armistice.
Without repelling any of the overtures made you, it is easy, to give
the Duke of Wellington to understand, that, if, in the present state
of affairs, the political question of the government of France _must
inevitably become the subject of a sort of discussion between France
and the allied powers_, the general interest of France, and of the
powers themselves, is to do nothing precipitately; and not to decide
on a definitive part, till after having maturely weighed what will
offer real guarantees for the future. It is possible, that the allied
powers themselves, when better informed of the sentiments of the
French nation, will not pe