ve no task or problem that psychology can claim as its
distinctive possession. The analysis of what is in the focus of
consciousness is adequately provided for in the other sciences; it is
only with the introduction of what is called the margin that an
enterprise of a different kind becomes necessary. But, secondly, this
distinction of focus and margin cannot be drawn on the basis of the
experienced contrast between clearness and obscureness. The very fact
that anything is experienced as obscure means that it is an object of
attention, or, in other words, that it is in the focus of consciousness
and not in the margin. The comparison of focus and margin with direct
and indirect vision is misleading, because it suggests that experiences
are marginal in proportion as they are felt as obscure. And, thirdly, if
we undertake to distinguish between focus and margin on the basis of a
difference in clearness or vividness of which no note is taken at the
time, we encounter the difficulty that experience or consciousness,
taken abstractly, does not admit of such variations in degree, and so
this criterion likewise goes by the board.

The situation is indeed peculiar. That there is a realm of psychological
fact is universally conceded. As a consequence of this conviction a
great body of fact and of doctrine has been built up. It would be folly
to deny either the distinctiveness or the significance of this
achievement. And yet James's description of psychology as "a string of
raw facts; a little gossip and wrangle about opinions; a little
classification and generalization on the mere descriptive level; a
strong prejudice that we _have_ states of mind and that our brain
conditions them,"[42] is not wholly untrue even today. It is even
possible for a present-day critic to outdo James and maintain that the
legitimacy of psychology as a separate inquiry is a matter of faith
rather than of sight. The 'raw facts' of which James speaks resolve
themselves into physical and physiological material on the one hand and
metaphysical dogmas on the other; the gossip and wrangle are largely
over fictitious problems; the classifications and generalizations as a
rule involve trespassing on other fields; the prejudice that we have
states of mind has less standing-ground today than it had twenty years
ago. In other words, there is still plausible ground for James's
pessimistic comment: "This is no science, it is only the hope of a
science." A situation