we are forced back upon either interactionism or else
epiphenomenalism, more or less disguised under a euphonious name, such
as psycho-physical parallelism or the double-aspect theory. That is, the
relation of stimulus and response is either reduced to plain cause and
effect or else is rejected altogether and supplanted by a bare
concomitance of the physical and mental series. In either case conscious
behavior is reduced to the type of reflex action, the only issue between
the two doctrines being the question whether or not it is necessary or
permissible to interpolate mental links in the causal chain.

According to the doctrine of parallelism, conscious behavior is nothing
more than a complicated form of reflex, which goes on without any
interference on the part of mind or intelligence. Intelligence adds
nothing to the situation except itself; it carries no implications or
new significance with regard to conduct. The psychic correlate is
permitted to tag along, but the explanations of response remain the same
in kind as they were before they reached the level of consciousness.
"Mere complexity should not becloud the issue. Every brain process, like
every reflex activity, is presumably the result of physico-chemical
processes. The assumption of a mysterious intuition or 'psychic force'
adds nothing to the mechanistic explanation, even when the latter is
most fragmentary. The interactionists go out of their way unnecessarily
in assuming a special activity of consciousness to account for the
dislocation of reactions from sensations. The nervous organization
suffices to explain it. Distant-stimuli and central stimuli co-operate
to bring about anticipatory reactions; foresight is but the conscious
side of this process. The phenomenon is _both_ physical and mental."[39]

The passage just quoted is fairly typical. Since the mental is an aspect
or concomitant of the physical it is clearly entitled to an occasional
honorable mention, but the fact remains that the explanation of behavior
is to be given wholly in terms of neural organization. The mental is
quite literally an "also ran." To say that a physico-chemical process is
also mental is of no particular significance as long as it is implied
that the end or goal of the process plays no part in shaping the course
of events. The mental simply gives dignity to the occasion, like the
sedan chair with no bottom, in which the Irishman's admirers, according
to James's story, ran hi