tted to
the rank of a natural science, on condition that it surrender its
pretension to be the science of the soul and confine itself to the study
of consciousness, is no longer considered binding. The suspicion is
growing that consciousness is nothing more nor less than an attenuated
form of the soul that it pretends to displace. Consequently the
psychology without a soul to which we have just become accustomed is now
attacked on behalf of a psychology without a consciousness, on the
ground that this latter standpoint alone can give assurance against
entangling alliances between psychology and metaphysics.

From the side of philosophy this situation is interesting, not only to
such as may crave the comfort that springs from the spectacle of
distress, but also to those who take a more hopeful view of present-day
tendencies. The question that is at issue is fundamentally the question
of the nature of consciousness, which is quite as important to
philosophy as to psychology. On the one hand it is maintained that
psychology has to do with consciousness and that its distinctive method
is the method of introspection. On the other hand it is urged that
psychology is nothing more nor less than a study of behavior, that it is
not a science at all, unless the existence of consciousness is denied or
at least ignored, and that the method of introspection is a delusion and
a snare. The two standpoints are not always clearly formulated, nor can
we say that every system of psychology is true to type. It is, in fact,
the lack of clearness in the fundamental concepts that makes the status
of psychology a matter of so much uncertainty.

The situation presents an apparent anomaly. Both parties profess to deal
with facts of observation, yet the claim of the introspectionist that he
observes facts of consciousness is met by the assertion of his rival
that there is no consciousness to be observed. How can this be, unless
we assume that introspection presupposes an esoteric principle, like the
principle of grace in religion? It seems evident that we have to do here
with some deep-seated misconception regarding the facts that are
supposed to constitute the subject-matter for observation and
description.

A common procedure on the part of introspectionism is to assert the
existence of consciousness as something which is indeed indefinable, but
which admits of observation and description. But this procedure is no
longer justified. In the fir