d any possible use
to which increased knowledge might lead. The cult of increasing
knowledge, of continually reconstructing the world, took the place both
of the ancient conception of adequately organizing the world as
presented in thought, and of the medieval conception of a systematic
formulation on the basis of the statement in church dogma of social
values. This modern conception proceeds from the standpoint not of
formulating values, but giving society at the moment the largest
possible number of alternatives of conduct, i.e., undertaking to fix
from moment to moment the widest possible field of conduct. The purposes
of conduct are to be determined in the presence of a field of
alternative possibilities of action. The ends of conduct are not to be
determined in advance, but in view of the interests that fuller
knowledge of conditions awaken. So there appears a conception of
determining the field that shall be quite independent of given values. A
real world which consists not of an unchanged universe, but of a
universe which may be continually readjusted according to the problems
arising in the consciousness of the individuals within society. The
seemingly fixed character of such a world is found in the generally
fixed conditions which underlie the type of problems which we find. We
determine the important conditions incident to the working out of the
great problems which face us. Our conception of a given universe is
formed in the effort to mobilize all the material about us in relation
to these problems--the structure of the self, the structure of matter,
the physical process of life, the laws of change and the interrelation
of changes. With reference to these problems certain conditions appear
fixed and become the statement of the world by which we must determine
by experimental test the viability of our hypotheses. There arises then
the conception of a world which is unquestioned over against any
particular problem. While our science continually changes that world, at
least it must be always realized as there. On the other hand, these
conceptions are after all relative to the ends of social conduct which
may be formulated in the presence of any freedom of action.
We postulate freedom of action as the condition of formulating the ends
toward which our conduct shall be directed. Ancient thought assured
itself of its ends of conduct and allowed these to determine the world
which tested its hypothesis. We insist su
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