of the profound
statesmen, the exalted patriots, to whom the task of constitutional
reform was intrusted? Did the name of Washington sanction, did the
States deliberately ratify, such an anomaly in the history of
fundamental legislation? No; we were not mistaken. The letter of this
great instrument is free from this radical fault. Its language directly
contradicts the imputation; its spirit, its evident intent, contradicts
it. No; we did not err. Our Constitution does not contain the absurdity
of giving power to make laws and another to resist them. The sages whose
memory will always be reverenced have given us a practical and, as they
hoped, a permanent constitutional compact. The Father of his Country did
not affix his revered name to so palpable an absurdity. Nor did the
States, when they severally ratified it, do so under the impression that
a veto on the laws of the United States was reserved to them or that
they could exercise it by implication. Search the debates in all their
conventions, examine the speeches of the most zealous opposers of
Federal authority, look at the amendments that were proposed; they are
all silent--not a syllable uttered, not a vote given, not a motion made
to correct the explicit supremacy given to the laws of the Union over
those of the States, or to show that implication, as is now contended,
could defeat it. No; we have not erred. The Constitution is still the
object of our reverence, the bond of our Union, our defense in danger,
the source of our prosperity in peace. It shall descend, as we have
received it, uncorrupted by sophistical construction, to our posterity;
and the sacrifices of local interest, of State prejudices, of personal
animosities, that were made to bring it into existence, will again be
patriotically offered for its support.

The two remaining objections made by the ordinance to these laws are
that the sums intended to be raised by them are greater than are
required and that the proceeds will be unconstitutionally employed.

The Constitution has given, expressly, to Congress the right of raising
revenue and of determining the sum the public exigencies will require.
The States have no control over the exercise of this right other than
that which results from the power of changing the representatives who
abuse it, and thus procure redress. Congress may undoubtedly abuse this
discretionary power; but the same may be said of others with which they
are vested. Yet the di