them; hence this desire becomes part of their
education, is matured in manhood, and produces an ardent affection for
their country, and it is the opinion of the great Sidney and Montesquieu
that this is, in a great measure, produced by annual election of
magistrates.
If annual elections were to exist in this government, and learning and
information to become more prevalent, you never would want men to execute
whatever you could design. Sidney observes _that a well-governed state is
as fruitful to all good purposes as the seven-headed serpent is said to
have been in evil; when one head is cut off, many rise up in the place of
it_. He remarks further that _it was also thought that free cities, by
frequent election of magistrates, became nurseries of great and able men,
every man endeavoring to excel others, that he might be advanced to the
honor he had no other title to, than what might arise from his merit or
reputation_; but the framers of this _perfect government_, as it is
called, have departed from this democratical principle, and established
biennial elections for the house of representatives, who are to be chosen
by the people, and sextennial for the senate, who are to be chosen by the
legislatures of the different states, and have given to the executive the
unprecedented power of making temporary senators, in case of vacancies by
resignation or otherwise, and so far forth establishing a precedent for
virtual representation (though, in fact, their original appointment is
virtual), thereby influencing the choice of the legislatures, or if they
should not be so complaisant as to conform to his appointment, offence
will be given to the executive, and the temporary members will appear
ridiculous by rejection; this temporary member, during his time of
appointment, will of course act by a power derived from the executive, and
for, and under his immediate influence.
It is a very important objection to this government, that the
representation consists of so few; too few to resist the influence of
corruption, and the temptation to treachery, against which all governments
ought to take precautions--how guarded you have been on this head, in your
own state constitution, and yet the number of senators and representatives
proposed for this vast continent does not equal those of your own state;
how great the disparity, if you compare them with the aggregate numbers in
the United States. The history of representation in Englan
|