ry
advantage to the Confederate forces, who knew every inch of it, where
Grant's superiority in numbers could not be brought fully into play, and
where his even greater superiority in artillery was completely
neutralized. At the end of a week's hard fighting, Grant had gained no
advantage, while the Northern losses were appalling--as great as the
total original numbers of the enemy that inflicted them. At
Spottsylvania, where Grant attempted a flanking movement, the same
tactics were pursued with the same success, while a final attempt of the
Northern general at a frontal assault ended in a costly defeat.

In the darkest hour of this campaign Grant had told the Government at
Washington that he would "fight it out on that line if it took all the
summer." It was, however, on another line that the issue was being
fought out and decided against the Confederacy. From Chattanooga
Sherman moved on Atlanta, the capital of Georgia. Joseph Johnstone
disputed every step of the advance, making it as costly as possible, but
wisely refused to risk his numerically inferior army in a general
engagement. He fell back slowly, making a stand here and there, till the
Northern general stood before Atlanta.

It was at this moment that the leaders of the Confederacy would have
acted wisely in proposing terms of peace. Their armies were still in
being, and could even boast conspicuous and recent successes. If the war
went on it would probably be many months before the end came, while the
North was bitterly weary of the slaughter and would not tolerate the
refusal of reasonable settlement. Yet, if the war went on, the end could
no longer be in doubt. Had that golden moment been seized, the seceding
States might have re-entered the Union almost on their own terms.
Certainly they could have avoided the abasement and humiliation which
was to come upon them as the consequence of continuing their resistance
till surrender had to be unconditional. It might seem at first that
Emancipation Proclamation had introduced an additional obstacle to
accommodation. But this was largely neutralized by the fact that every
one, including Jefferson Davis himself, recognized that Slavery had been
effectively destroyed by the war and could never be revived, even were
the South victorious. The acceptance by the Confederacy of a policy
suggested by Lee, whereby Negroes were to be enlisted as soldiers and
freed on enlistment, clinched this finally. On the other hand,