at conduciveness to such happiness is the test
of morality--'Intuitionists,' strange to say, is the distinctive
appellation which they propose to affix to all those who hesitate to
accept as ethical foundation stones the results of their intuitional
evolution.

Scarcely by a taunt so readily rebuttable will anti-Utilitarians be
excited to speedier apprehension of the nature of the lien which
corporate self-interest is presumed to have upon individual
self-devotion. Not the less tenaciously may they cling to their belief
in the right of every one to do as he will with whatever has come by
fair means into his exclusive and complete possession. Neither, I
venture to think, need less store be set by that right in consequence of
an objection very adroitly taken to it by Mr. Mill, which, on account
both of its inherent ingenuity and of its having been addressed more
immediately to myself, it would be inexcusable in me to leave
unexamined. In Mr. Mill's opinion, the right in question, even if valid,
would be valueless, because it would be neutralised by precisely similar
rights belonging to society. If, he argues, individuals are at liberty
to do as they will with their own, so likewise must society be. But
'existing social arrangements and law itself exist in virtue not only of
the forbearance, but of the active support of the labouring classes' who
in every community constitute a numerical majority. This working-class
majority might then if they pleased withdraw their support from existing
arrangements, thereby depriving person and property of social
protection; and by merely threatening such withdrawal they could compel
individuals to acquiesce in their most extravagant demands. 'They might
bind the rich to take the whole burden of taxation upon themselves. They
might bind them to give employment, at liberal wages, to a number of
labourers in a direct ratio to the amount of their incomes. They might
enforce on them a total abolition of inheritance and bequest.' Mr. Mill
maintains that these things, although exceedingly foolish, might
according to my principles, with perfect equity be done; nay, if I
understand him correctly, that according neither to mine nor to any one
else's principles can any adequate reason be assigned why they should
not be done, except that their practical results would be baneful
instead of beneficial. And taking this view, he is fully warranted in
asking what it can matter that according to my theor