, though
either causes or hindrances of good to their fellow-creatures, lie
beyond the domain of duty, and within that of virtue or merit, he goes
on to assign as the sole reason for placing them in the domain of the
latter that, in respect to them, it is, on the whole, for the general
interest that people should be left free, thereby plainly intimating
that society would be equitably entitled to insist on them if it thought
proper. But conduct that can be equitably insisted on is clearly, in the
strictest sense, duty; and it would be preposterous to claim merit for
doing that which it would be a breach of duty to leave undone. Duties do
not cease to be duties because he on whom they are incumbent is not
compelled under penalty to perform them, any more than debts cease to be
debts because creditors do not choose to ask for payment. All consistent
utilitarian teaching points inflexibly towards Mr. Morley's conclusion,
according to which justice and social virtue are absolutely identical,
and according to which, also, whoever does not shape his 'conduct, &c.,
in harmony with the highest good of all,' does less than is due from
him, while it is impossible for him to do more. For whatever he propose
to do must either be or not be in the prescribed harmony. If it be, he
is bound to do it. If not, he is bound not to do it. The very utmost he
can do is no more than is incumbent upon him. Less than his very utmost
is less than is incumbent. No action of his, therefore, can possess any
merit; for mere fulfilment of obligations is reckoned not of grace, but
of debt. Having done everything, he is still but an unprofitable
servant; he has but done that which was his duty to do. Where, then, is
the boast of virtue? It is excluded. By what law? By that of
Utilitarianism, set forth in its full amplitude. Honesty and generosity,
faith, truth, charity, patient endurance, and chivalrous self-devotion,
all are mingled together under the name of justice, and justice itself
only remains just as long as it remains identical with the largest
expediency.

At this rate we cannot possibly have any virtue to plume ourselves upon.
The best we can do being no more than our duly, the only reward we can
claim is exemption from the punishment we should have deserved if we had
not done it. Whether it be that we have abstained from killing or
robbing our fellow-citizens for our own advantage, or have impoverished
or half-killed ourselves in the service