he charge of fallacy, of which otherwise it must here stand convicted,
and that is by renouncing all claim to be a new system of ethics, and
not pretending to be more than a new system of nomenclature. And even
so, it could not help contradicting, and thereby refuting itself. That
nothing is right but what is of preponderating utility; that whatever is
of preponderating utility is right; these are propositions perfectly
intelligible, indeed, but which will be found to be tenable only on
condition that the very same things may be both right and wrong. The
confusion, thrice confounded, inseparable from the substitution of such
novel definitions for those which had previously been universally in
vogue, is but the smaller of two evils which must thence arise. It would
be bad enough that the word 'right' could not be used without raising
doubt whether what people had previously understood by the 'just' or the
'generous,' or only the 'expedient' were meant; but a still worse
consequence would be that, even if no doubt of the sort were
entertained, and if all men were agreed to take the word in none but its
utilitarian sense, the landmarks of right and wrong would thereby be
well nigh obliterated. Due credit has already been given to
Utilitarianism for its exemplary zeal in inculcating the practice of
virtue, but its merit in that respect is more than neutralised by its
equally zealous inculcation of principles, according to which it is
impossible to decide beforehand whether any particular practice will be
virtuous or not.

This is my second charge against Utilitarianism. I maintain it to be a
doctrine in most of its essentials erroneous; but I maintain, further,
that, even if it were correct, instead of furnishing us with an
infallible criterion of right and wrong, it would deprive us of the
means of clearly distinguishing between right and wrong at all times at
which the power of so distinguishing is of practical value. Bluntly
enough, I have pronounced it to be false. With equal bluntness, I now
add that, even if it were true, it would, all the same, be practically
mischievous, and directly opposed to the very utility from which it
takes its name. The argument in support of this charge shall now be
stated.

According to utilitarian ethics, the morality of actions depends wholly
and solely on their consequences. On this point the language of
authority is distinct, emphatic, unanimous, and self-contradictory.
'Utilitarian