ltitude
of merits.

My first charge against Utilitarianism is that it is not true. I do not
say that there is no truth in it. That I have found much to admire in
its premises has been frankly avowed; and in one, at least, of the
leading deductions from those premises I partially concur. I admit that
acts utterly without utility must likewise be utterly without worth;
that conduct which subserves the enjoyment neither of oneself nor of any
one else, cannot, except in a very restricted sense, be termed right;
that conduct which interferes with the enjoyment both of oneself and of
all others, which injuring oneself injures others also, and benefits no
one, cannot be otherwise than wrong; that purely objectless asceticism
which has not even self-discipline in view, is not virtue, but folly;
that misdirected charity which, engendering improvidence, creates more
distress than it relieves, is not virtue, but criminal weakness. But
though admitting that there can be no virtue without utility, I do not
admit either that virtue must be absent unless utility preponderate, or
that if utility preponderate virtue must be present. I deny that any
amount of utility can of itself constitute virtue. I deny that whatever
adds to the general happiness must be right. Equally do I deny that
whatever diminishes the general happiness or prevents its increasing
must be wrong. An action, be it observed, may be right in three
different senses. It may be right as being meritorious, and deserving of
commendation. It may be right as being that which one is bound to do,
for the doing of which, therefore, one deserves no praise, and for
neglecting to do which one would justly incur blame. It may be right
simply as not being wrong--as being allowable--something which one has a
right to do, though to refrain from doing it might perhaps be
praiseworthy. There will be little difficulty in adducing examples of
conduct which, though calculated to diminish the sum total of happiness,
would be right in the first of these senses. Nothing can be easier than
to multiply examples of such conduct that would be right in the third
sense. I proceed to cite cases which will answer both these purposes,
and likewise the converse one of showing that conduct calculated to
increase the general happiness may nevertheless be wrong.

When the Grecian chiefs, assembled at Aulis, were waiting for a fair
wind to convey them to Ilium, they were, we are told, warned by what was