hose distinctive peculiarities of different kinds of
pleasure which entitle them to different places in our esteem.
All pleasures may be arranged under five heads, and in regularly
ascending series, as follows:--
1. Sensual pleasures:--To wit, those of eating and drinking, and
whatever others are altogether of the flesh, fleshly.
2. Emotional, by which are to be understood agreeable moods of the mind,
such as, irrespectively of any agreeable idea brought forward
simultaneously by association, are produced by music ('for,' as Milton
says, 'eloquence the soul, song charms the sense'), by beauty of form or
colour, by genial sunshine, by balmy or invigorating air.
3. Imaginative, or pleasures derived from the contemplation of mental
pictures.
4. Intellectual, or those consequent on exercise of the reasoning
powers.
5. Moral, or those which are alluded to when virtue is spoken of as
being its own reward.[2]
That of these several kinds, each of the last four is preferable to any
preceding it on the list will, it is to be hoped, be allowed to pass as
an unquestioned truth, for to any one perverse enough to deny it, the
only answer that can be made is an appeal to observation in proof that
all persons who are equally acquainted with the several kinds do exhibit
the preferences indicated. Neither, so far as the two kinds first-named
alone are concerned, is it possible to go much more deeply into the
reasons why emotional pleasures are to be preferred to sensual, than by
pointing to the fact that all competent judges of both are observed to
like the former best. If all those who are endowed with equal
sensitiveness of ear and of palate prefer music to feasting, and would
any day give up a dinner at Francatelli's for the sake of hearing a
rejuvenescent Persiani as Zerlina, or Patti as Dinorah, the one thing
presumable is, that all such persons derive more enjoyment from perfect
melody than from perfect cookery, and little else remains to be said on
the subject. The same ultimate fact need not, however, limit our inquiry
as to the preferableness of imaginative or intellectual to emotional
pleasures, and of moral to any of the other three. This admits of, and
demands, a more subtle explanation, from which we may learn, not merely
that certain preferences are shown, but also why they are shown. The
preferences in question are demonstrably not due to the greater
poignancy of the pleasures preferred. It is simply not tru
|