ice.' It seems more probable that certain things were commanded
because they were deemed just, than that they were deemed just because
they were commanded. Even the ancient Hebrews, who 'believed their laws
to be a direct emanation from the Supreme Being,' although, if asked why
it was wrong to kill or steal, they might very likely have replied,
'Because theft and murder have been forbidden by God,' would still have
acknowledged that it would be wrong to kill or steal, even if there had
been no divine prohibition of the practices. And when we recollect that
among 'other nations, and in particular the Greeks and Romans, who,
knowing that their laws had been made by men, were not afraid to admit
that men might make bad laws, ... the sentiment of justice came to be
attached, not to all violations of law, but only to violations of such
laws as ought to exist,' what had previously appeared probable is
converted into certainty. Principles of justice to which law ought to
conform cannot but have been anterior to law, and cannot have originated
in law. And certainty on this point grows still more certain, assurance
becomes doubly sure, when we reflect that, as was pointed out above,
many things are just which, not only does not law command, but which
justice barely tolerates, permitting them, indeed, to be done, but
permitting them also to be reprobated.
Secondly, we may perceive that in mere justice there can be nothing
praiseworthy. Justice is nothing more than abstinence from injustice,
and no commendation can be due for not doing that the doing of which
would deserve censure. Justice, if entitled to be ranked among the
virtues at all, is at best only a negative virtue, as being the reverse
of a vice. It is distinguished from all other moral qualities, as being
the single and solitary one, compliance with whose behests is a duty
which we owe to others. Of meekness, patience, temperance, fortitude,
courtesy, whatever display it may for any reason be our duty to make,
precisely that display justice requires us to make. Whatever of any one
of these qualities justice does not exact from us, we may, without
wronging any one, omit. We must not, indeed, incapacitate ourselves by
tippling for our proper work, nor offend the eyes or ears of decenter
folk by reeling obstreperously through the streets; but, if we take the
precaution of retiring during an interval of leisure to our privy
chamber, our making beasts of ourselves then and
|