that he
have it from those from whom it is due, and do not take it from those
from whom it is not due. The latter, surely, at least as much deserve to
be allowed to keep what they have already by honest means got, as others
to get what they have not yet got. But if so, then that these should be
deprived of their deserts, in order that those may get theirs, is surely
about the very last doctrine that ought to be put forward as
self-evident and intuitive. 'But,' Mr. Mill proceeds to ask, 'if there
be in the natural constitution of things something patently unjust,
something contrary to sentiments of justice, which sentiments, being
intuitive, are supposed to have been implanted in us by the same Creator
who made the order of things that they protest against--do not these
sentiments impose upon us the duty of striving by all human means to
repair the injustice? And if, on the contrary, we avail ourselves of it
for our own personal advantage, do we not make ourselves participators
in injustice, allies and auxiliaries of the Evil Principle?'[10] Now, as
I have already said, I am myself no intuitionist, but if I were, I
should not the less feel warranted in here replying that by no theory of
justice, intuitive or other, can the passive spectator of an injustice
to which he is no party be bound to assist in repairing the injustice,
simply because he has the means. A creditor denied payment of his fair
debts does not get what he deserves; but upon whom, except the
defaulting debtor, does it therefore become incumbent to repair the
latter's injustice by paying his debts? And if there be in the general
order of mundane affairs, as--provided I may attribute the existence of
it, as of all other evil, not to God, but to the devil--I don't mind
admitting there may be--something which prevents many of our
fellow-creatures from getting their desserts, something contrary,
therefore, to our sentiments of justice whether those sentiments have
been implanted in us by the Creator or not, I still maintain that those
sentiments do not impose upon us the duty of striving to correct the
injustice. They necessarily stimulate us more or less powerfully,
according to their own intrinsic strength, to undertake that noblest of
all tasks, but they do not render it imperative upon us. Whether, if we
actively avail ourselves of the injustice for our own profit--though
this, by the way, is no more than every one of us does who takes
advantage of competi
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