tle of Utilitarianism, been
triumphantly replied that it is really they themselves who insult human
nature by using language that assumes human beings to be capable of no
higher pleasures than those of which swine are capable; and that,
moreover, if the assumption were correct, and if the capacities of men
and of swine were identical, whatever rule of life were good enough for
the latter would likewise be good enough for the former. But I am not an
assailant of this description. Inasmuch as there undeniably are very
many and very various kinds of pleasure, I of course allow
Utilitarianism credit for common sense enough to acknowledge that those
kinds are most worthy of pursuit which, from whatever cause, possess
most value--that those which are most precious are those most to be
prized. But whoever allows thus much will have no alternative but to
concede a great deal more. The most precious of pleasures is that which
arises from the practice of virtue, as may be proved conclusively in the
only way of which the case admits, viz., by reference to the fact that,
whoever is equally acquainted with that and with other pleasures,
deliberately prefers it to all the rest, will, if necessary, forego all
others for its sake, and values no others obtainable only at its
expense. By necessary implication it follows that, as being more
valuable than any other, the pleasure arising from the practice of
virtue must be that which Utilitarianism recommends above all others as
an object of pursuit. But the pursuit of this particular pleasure and
the practice of virtue are synonymous terms. What, therefore,
Utilitarianism above all other things recommends and insists upon is the
practice of virtue. Now, the practice of virtue commonly involves
subordination of one's own interest to that of other people; indeed,
virtue would not be virtue in the utilitarian sense of the word unless
it did involve such subordination. Wherefore the pleasure arising from
the practice of virtue, the pleasure which occupies the highest place on
the utilitarian scale, and that which Utilitarianism exhorts its
disciples chiefly to seek after, is nothing else than the pleasure
derived from attending to other people's pleasure instead of to our own.

Nor is this all. In order adequately to appreciate the loftiness of
utilitarian teaching, and its utter exemption from the sordidness with
which it is ignorantly charged, we must devote a few moments to
examination of t