ould have allowed the coming about of such a state of things as led to
the dispute with Prussia. The entire action of the Austrian government
with reference to the affairs of Germany, for several years, was
admirably calculated to lead to what has taken place this year. That
government, had it been wise, never would have acted with Prussia in the
matter of the Danish duchies. It would have insisted on the fulfilment
of the arrangement that was made years before, in which case it would
have been supported by the whole power of France and England, and not
improbably by that of Russia; and against so great an array of force,
Prussia, even if backed by the opinion of Germany, never would have
thought of contending,--and some of the German governments would have
sided with the allies, and would have behaved much more efficiently than
they did in the late war. Prussia would have been isolated, as France
was in 1840; and that party which was opposed to Bismarck's policy would
have obtained control of her councils, the effect of which would have
been to preserve peace, the very thing that was most necessary to
Austria's welfare. Instead of opposing Prussia, Austria joined her, and
insisted on having a part in the very business that offended the Germans
as much as it disgusted foreigners. Thus a state of things was brought
about which made a German war inevitable, while Austria was deprived of
all aid from abroad. England's sympathies were with Austria, as against
Prussia; and yet England had been shabbily treated by Austria in respect
to the duchies, and it was impossible for her either to forget or
forgive such treatment. France had less cause to be offended; but
Napoleon III. could not have approved of action which seemed to be taken
in disregard of his high position in Europe, and was calculated to
advance the ends of Prussia,--the power least respected by the
French,--and which finally made of that power the destroyer of the
settlement of 1815,[32] a part the Emperor had intended for himself.
Having acted thus unwisely, and having no support from Russia, Austria
should have avoided war in 1866, at any cost; and it was in her power to
avoid it down to the time that she made the German Diet so proceed as to
furnish Prussia with an excellent reason for setting her well-prepared
armies in motion against the ill-prepared forces of her foe. Noting the
folly of Austria, and observing that the French government, if M. de
Lavalette's