ary Ridge, from which he could see the broken
lines of the enemy rapidly retreating up the slope of Cemetery Range,
in his front. The propriety of pursuit, with a view to seizing this
strong position, was obvious, and General Lee sent an officer of his
staff with a message to General Ewell, to the effect that "he could
see the enemy flying, that they were disorganized, and that it was
only necessary to push on vigorously, and the Cemetery heights were
ours." [Footnote: The officer who carried the order is our authority
for this statement.] Just about the moment, it would seem, when this
order was dispatched--about half-past four--General Hill, who had
joined Lee on the ridge, "received a message from General Ewell,
requesting him (Hill) to press the enemy in front, while he performed
the same operation on his right." This statement is taken from the
journal of Colonel Freemantle, who was present and noted the hour. He
adds: "The pressure was accordingly applied, in a mild degree, but the
enemy were too strongly posted, and it was too late in the evening
for a regular attack." General Ewell, an officer of great courage and
energy, is said to have awaited the arrival of his third division
(Johnson's) before making a decisive assault. Upon the arrival of
Johnson, about sunset, General Ewell prepared to advance and seize
upon the eastern terminus of the Cemetery Range, which commanded the
subsequent Federal position. At this moment General Lee sent him word
to "proceed with his troops to the [Confederate] right, in case he
could do nothing where he was;" he proceeded to General Lee's tent
thereupon to confer with him, and the result was that it was agreed
to first assault the hill on the right. It was now, however, after
midnight, and the attack was directed by Lee to be deferred until the
next morning.
It was certainly unfortunate that the advance was not then made; but
Lee, in his report, attributes no blame to any one. "The attack,"
he says, "was not pressed that afternoon, _the enemy's force being
unknown, and it being considered advisable to await the arrival of the
rest of our troops._"
The failure to press the enemy immediately after their retreat, with
the view of driving them from and occupying Cemetery Heights, is
susceptible of an explanation which seems to retrieve the Southern
commander and his subordinates from serious criticism. The Federal
forces had been driven from the ground north and west of Gettysbu
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