nd their relations one to another, if a man
should make a triangle with four corners, or a trapezium with four right
angles: that is, in plain English, change the names of the figures, and
call that by one name, which mathematicians call ordinarily by another.
For, let a man make to himself the idea of a figure with three angles,
whereof one is a right one, and call it, if he please, EQUILATERUM or
TRAPEZIUM, or anything else; the properties of, and demonstrations about
that idea will be the same as if he called it a rectangular triangle. I
confess the change of the name, by the impropriety of speech, will at
first disturb him who knows not what idea it stands for: but as soon as
the figure is drawn, the consequences and demonstrations are plain and
clear. Just the same is it in moral knowledge: let a man have the idea
of taking from others, without their consent, what their honest industry
has possessed them of, and call this JUSTICE if he please. He that takes
the name here without the idea put to it will be mistaken, by joining
another idea of his own to that name: but strip the idea of that name,
or take it such as it is in the speaker's mind, and the same things will
agree to it, as if you called it INJUSTICE. Indeed, wrong names in moral
discourses breed usually more disorder, because they are not so easily
rectified as in mathematics, where the figure, once drawn and seen,
makes the name useless and of no force. For what need of a sign, when
the thing signified is present and in view? But in moral names, that
cannot be so easily and shortly done, because of the many decompositions
that go to the making up the complex ideas of those modes. But yet for
all this, the miscalling of any of those ideas, contrary to the usual
signification of the words of that language, hinders not but that we may
have certain and demonstrative knowledge of their several agreements and
disagreements, if we will carefully, as in mathematics, keep to the same
precise ideas, and trace THEM in their several relations one to another,
without being led away by their names. If we but separate the idea under
consideration from the sign that stands for it, our knowledge goes
equally on in the discovery of real truth and certainty, whatever sounds
we make use of.

10. Misnaming disturbs not the certainty of the Knowledge

One thing more we are to take notice of, That where God or any other
law-maker, hath defined any moral names, there they hav