uller attacked the enemy in full force. The Dutchmen held very
strong positions north of Colenso, their camps and laagers being linked
with those surrounding the southern side of Ladysmith, while to the
south of the river they also held a formidable and commanding post.
About three miles in front was an open plain, with hardly a vestige of
cover in any direction. All around was a crescent-shaped constellation
of high kopjes. The great hill of Hlangwane, on the left flank of the
enemy, though it was not known at the onset, was strongly fortified, and
_vis-a-vis_ to the Hlangwane guns on the extreme right were posted more
guns. Between these two eminences was the plain aforesaid, veined with
dongas which reached to the terribly steep banks of the river, where
were more intrenchments. From Fort Wylie, another of the fortified
kopjes, the Boers commanded the little village of Colenso and the
expanse of country through which Sir Redvers Buller proposed to advance
to Ladysmith. The Tugela, wide and deep, ran between the foes, except on
the left of the Doer position, where the Dutchmen held both banks of the
river.

Upon their defensive works the Boers had spent a vast amount of labour.
Besides rows of trenches cunningly concealed by grass and scrub upon the
flats on both sides of the river, barbed wire entanglements complicated
the situation both at the trenches and under the water at the river
fords. The water of the river was also deepened by means of
cleverly-made dams, in order that any troops which might endeavour to
ford the current would find themselves carried off their feet.

[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF COLENSO--QUEEN'S (ROYAL WEST SURREY)
REGIMENT LEADING THE CENTRAL ATTACK.

Drawing by J. Finnemore, R.I.]

But, of course, the intricacy of these ingenious arrangements was only
discovered at the cost of bitter experience. Later on, a great deal of
after-the-event wisdom was forthcoming, and the ignorance of all
concerned regarding the nature of the position to be attacked was
severely commented upon. It was said that no satisfactory reconnaissance
of the enemy's position was made, and that accurate knowledge of the
nature of the ground to be passed over was not forthcoming. It was also
averred that neither subordinate officers nor men were informed of what
was expected of them, and that the only maps supplied to regimental
officers were small-scale maps of the whole of South Africa, forty miles
to the inch. Howe