this demand with a constancy and an energy that cannot well nor long be
resisted. There are, happily, enough of regulated governments in the
world, and those among the most distinguished, to operate as constant
examples, and to keep alive an unceasing panting in the bosoms of men
for the enjoyment of similar free institutions.

When the English Revolution of 1688 took place, the English people did
not content themselves with the example of Runnymede; they did not build
their hopes upon royal charters; they did not, like the authors of the
Laybach circular, suppose that all useful changes in constitutions and
laws must proceed from those only whom God has rendered responsible for
power. They were somewhat better instructed in the principles of civil
liberty, or at least they were better lovers of those principles than
the sovereigns of Laybach. Instead of petitioning for charters, they
declared their rights, and while they offered to the Prince of Orange
the crown with one hand, they held in the other an enumeration of those
privileges which they did not profess to hold as favors, but which they
demanded and insisted upon as their undoubted rights.

I need not stop to observe, Mr. Chairman, how totally hostile are these
doctrines of Laybach to the fundamental principles of our government.
They are in direct contradiction; the principles of good and evil are
hardly more opposite. If these principles of the sovereigns be true, we
are but in a state of rebellion or of anarchy, and are only tolerated
among civilized states because it has not yet been convenient to reduce
us to the true standard.

But the second, and, if possible, the still more objectionable
principle, avowed in these papers, is the right of forcible interference
in the affairs of other states. A right to control nations in their
desire to change their own government, wherever it maybe conjectured, or
pretended, that such change might furnish an example to the subjects of
other states, is plainly and distinctly asserted. The same Congress that
made the declaration at Laybach had declared, before its removal from
Troppau, "that the powers have an undoubted right to take a hostile
attitude in regard to those states in which the overthrow of the
government may operate as an example."

There cannot, as I think, be conceived a more flagrant violation of
public law, or national independence, than is contained in this short
declaration.

No matter what be the