of the Human Mind_, for a close criticism of which we must
refer readers to Mr. Stephen's second volume. The connection of these
dissertations with the social and political ends of the Utilitarians
lies, it may be said briefly, in the support which a purely
experiential psychology gives to the doctrine that human character
depends on external circumstance, and that such vague terms as the
'moral sense' only disguise the true identity of rules of morality
with the considerations that can be shown to produce general
happiness. Whenever there appears to be a conflict between these rules
and considerations, utility is the only sure criterion. To the extreme
situations in which casuistry revels, as when a man is called upon to
sacrifice his life or his personal honour for his country's good, the
Utilitarian would apply this unfailing test inexorably; in such cases
a man ought to decide upon a calculation of the greatest happiness of
the majority. He does not, in fact, apply this reckoning; he may
possibly not have time, at the urgent moment, to work it out; his
heroism is inspired by the universal praise or blame that reward
self-devotion or punish shrinking from it, and thus render acts moral
or immoral by the habitual association of ideas. The martyr or patriot
does not, indeed, stop to calculate; he does not feel the subtle
egoism that is hidden in the desire for applause; he believes himself
to be acting with the perfect disinterestedness which can only be
accounted for by superficial reasoners on the assumption of some such
abstract notion as religion, moral sense, or duty. Since the behaviour
of mankind at large, therefore, is invariably guided by a remote or
proximate consideration of utility; since conduct depends upon
character, and character is shaped by external conditions and positive
sanctions, it is possible to frame, on utilitarian principles,
scientific rules of behaviour which can be powerfully, though
indirectly, promoted by legislation and a system of enlightened
polity. For morality, it is argued, can be materially assisted by
pointing to, or even providing, the serious consequences that are
inseparable from human misdeeds, by proving that pain or pleasure
follows different kinds of behaviour; while motives are so complex
that they can never be verified with certainty, and must therefore be
left out of account. This anatomy of the springs of action obviously
lays bare some truths, although they fit in much