hat philosophers have at various times quite
cleverly discussed God and the providence with which he rules all
things. To some, such words have seemed so pious that they almost have
placed Socrates, Xenophon and Plato in the same rank with the
prophets; yet, because in these discussions the philosophers are
ignorant of the fact that God has sent his only Son into the world to
save sinners, these beautiful utterances are, according to the
declaration of this passage, consummate ignorance of God and mere
blasphemies, for the passage states unequivocally that all imagination
and effort of the human heart is only evil.

153. The text speaks, accordingly, not only of the sins before the
flood, but it speaks of the whole nature of man, his heart, his reason
and his intellect, even when man pretends to righteousness and desires
to be very holy, as do today the Anabaptists when they purpose in
their heart so to excel as to fail in nothing, when for a show they
attempt to attain the fairest virtues. The truth is that hearts
without the Holy Spirit are not only ignorant of God, but naturally
even hate him. How, then, can anything be aught but evil that proceeds
from ignorance and hatred of God?

154. Another question is here raised. Moses speaks thus: "When Jehovah
saw that every imagination of the thoughts of man's heart was only
evil continually, it repented him that he had made man on the earth."
If God foresees everything, why does the text say that he now first
sees? If God is wise, how can regret for having created anything
befall him? Why did he not see this sin or depraved nature of man from
the beginning of the world? Why does Scripture thus attribute to God
such things as a temporary will, vision and purpose? Are not the
purposes of God eternal and unalterable, incapable of being regretted?
Similar instances are found also in the prophets, where God threatens
penalties, as for instance to the Ninevites, and yet pardons the
penitent.

To this question the sophists have no other reply than this, that the
Scripture speaks after the manner of men, that such things are
ascribed to God accordingly through the use of a figure of speech.
Hence they contend concerning a double will of God, the will expressed
by signs (_voluntas signi_) and the will of his good pleasure
(_voluntas beneplaciti_). The will of his good pleasure, they say, is
constant and unchangeable, while the expressed will is subject to
change. For the signs